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Does the local presence of immigrant groups increase White hostility to 
immigration? Most research finds that diverse neighborhoods reduce White 
opposition to minorities and immigration. However, most studies at higher 
geographies find the reverse effect. We confirm this pattern for England and 
Wales for 2009-2012. Yet, contextual studies are open to selection bias, 
which is where this article makes its main contribution. Is White tolerance 
in diverse neighborhoods the result of a positive effect of inter-ethnic 
contact, or does it arise from White flight, with anti-immigrant Whites 
exiting diverse areas but remaining within wider geographies as radicalized 
opponents of immigration? We provide the first attempt we are aware of 
to track the opinions of in- and out-migrants, as well as stayers, from local 
areas over an extended period. We use 20 years of large-scale geocoded 
British longitudinal data and find only limited evidence of selection effects 
associated with White flight.
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How does local racial context affect attitudes to immigration? Do diverse 
locales reduce hostility as local Whites gain firsthand experience of minori-
ties and immigrants? Or have Whites in diverse locales self-selected them-
selves for toleration, with less tolerant individuals leaving the area. In a 
departure from previous literature on contextual effects in public opinion and 
voting, we use longitudinal data to test for selection effects associated with 
“White flight” so as to more clearly evaluate the contending claims of contact 
and threat theory for the case of England and Wales.
Theoretical Perspectives
Contact Theory
The debate between contact and threat theory is well established and sets the 
overarching framework for our analysis. Allport (1954) advances the argu-
ment that positive intergroup contacts improve groups’ perceptions of each 
other, reducing prejudice and social distance. Since then, considerable exper-
imental evidence has confirmed this view (e.g., Barlow, Louis, & Hewstone, 
2009; Hewstone et al., 2005). In a meta-analysis of 713 studies, Pettigrew 
and Tropp (2006) found that contact tended in most cases to significantly 
reduce intergroup prejudice. The effect of contact on prejudice reduction 
operates via improved knowledge, greater empathy, and especially, a reduc-
tion in intergroup anxiety (Barlow et al., 2012; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).1
Threat Theory
Against the contact hypothesis, the threat hypothesis claims the presence of 
minorities activates a sense of anxiety among members of the ethnic major-
ity. Diversity, far from incubating toleration, results in heightened conflict 
(Putnam, 2007). An extensive tradition of research on the racial threat hypoth-
esis, beginning with the landmark studies of Key (1949) and Blalock (1957) 
revealed higher levels of White animus toward African Americans in the rela-
tively diverse South, especially in counties with higher proportions of African 
Americans. Subsequent work generalized these findings to the Midwest and 
Northeast (Stein, Post, & Rinden, 2000).
Variation by Geographic Level
Since the work of Allport and Key, numerous studies (many summarized in 
Table 1) have been undertaken at various geographic scales, examining a 
series of dependent variables including attitudes to racial minorities, 
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Table 1. Meta-Analysis of Ethnic Context Literature.
Context Study  
Prison cells, social 
networks
Berg, 2009; Trulson & Marquart, 2002 −
Block groups, 
municipalities
 
 
Baybeck, 2006; Hjerm, 2009 +/−
Rink et al., 2009 =/−
Biggs & Knauss, 2012; Lubbers et al., 2006; 
Rydgren & Ruth, 2011
−
Perceived neighborhood Kitschelt, 1996; Mayer, 1995; Robinson, 
1980; Sigelman & Welch, 1993; Surace & 
Seeman, 1967; Yancey, 1999
−
 Quillian, 1995 +
Housing projects Ford, 1973 −
U.S. census tracts Hajnal et al., 2011; Wilson, 1979 +
 Ha, 2010; Oliver & Wong, 2003 −
British MSOAs Laurence, 2013 −
Tract and locale Welch et al., 2001 −
British wards Bowyer, 2008; Harris, 2012 −
Zip codes Emerson et al., 2001; Gilliam et al., 2002 −
Precincts/boroughs Carsey, 1995 −
British local authorities Biggs & Knauss, 2012; Bowyer, 2008; Ford & 
Goodwin, 2010; Harris, 2012
+
French departements Kitschelt, 1995; Mayer, 1995 +
U.S. counties Blalock, 1957; Branton & Jones, 2005; Eitle 
et al., 2002; Giles & Evans, 1986; Glaser, 
1994; Hopkins, 2011; Key, 1949; Reed, 
1972; Rocha et al., 2011; Stein, Post, & 
Rinden, 2000; Wright, 1976
+
 Hood & Morris, 1997, 2000; Morris, 2000 −
 Corzine et al., 1983; Dixon, 2006; Newman 
& Johnson, 2012
+/−
 Campbell, Wong, & Citrin, 2006 =
Louisiana Parishes Giles & Buckner, 1993; Giles & Hertz, 1994; 
Voss, 1996
+
Metropolitan areas Arp et al., 1999; Dixon, 2006; Fossett & 
Kiecolt, 1989; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001, 
2002; Rocha & Espino, 2009; Taylor, 1998
+
 Ha, 2010 +/−
Countries Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001, 2002; Quillian, 
1995; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 
2006; Semyonov & Glikman, 2009
+
 Citrin & Sides, 2008 =
“+” denotes a positive relationship between minority/immigrant share and hostility to outgroups/
immigration (i.e., threat response); “−” denotes a negative (contact response); and “=” denotes a neutral 
relationship. MSOAs = middle layer superoutput areas.
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multiculturalism policies, immigrants, and immigration. Some are aggregate 
analyses while others take the form of surveys that include contextual predic-
tors. Most derive contextual data from the census, although several ask indi-
viduals to answer with reference to their perceived “neighbourhood.” An 
increasing number of analyses are multi-level in nature. The methodology 
varies: Sometimes there are controls for socioeconomic and political charac-
teristics of neighborhoods; certain works contain a richer variety of attitudi-
nal items than others; some focus on attitudes to African Americans, others 
on Hispanics or Muslims, still others on immigrants or support for anti-immi-
grant parties.
From this research, a pattern—though far from uniform—emerges. A 
summary, by no means complete, of work in this area, appears in Table 1, 
which updates a similar exercise undertaken by Cho and Baer (2011).2 We 
located 24 studies at ward or tract level (population around 7,500) or below, 
and found that about three quarters link local diversity to reduced animosity 
toward minorities, immigrants, and immigration, whereas just 25% find that 
more diversity in the locale increases hostility. Work at larger geographic 
scales reveals a different relationship. Suddenly, the association between 
diversity and toleration reverses itself. At county level or above, for instance, 
diversity is associated with heightened White threat perceptions of minorities 
or immigrants in 84% of a sample of 44 papers (by no means exhaustive), 
which deploy contexts containing approximately 100,000 people or more.3
Contact and threat theorists differ in their explanation of the aforemen-
tioned pattern. Because Whites’ opportunity for contact with minorities is 
greater if they encounter diversity in their local area, it should follow that 
diverse contexts up to the level of the neighborhood or ward will reduce 
opposition to minorities, immigrants, and immigration. At larger levels, 
opportunities for contact are reduced so threat effects may prevail. As 
Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) remark,
We suggest that, for social contexts smaller than those used in the present study 
[Dutch municipalities], the primary impact of minority group size will be an 
enhancement of opportunities for intergroup contact . . . In contrast, for 
relatively large contexts . . . we consider outgroup size to be . . . associated with 
an enhancement of threat perceptions. (p. 293)
The principal reason threat theorists expect to find lower White threat 
responses to diversity at neighborhood level than at higher geographies is that 
threatened individuals can readily leave a locale but find it harder to vacate 
an entire metropolitan area. In this sense, they are acting to maintain ethnic 
boundaries in the face of immigration, realizing Michael Walzer’s (1983) 
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dictum that “Neighborhoods can be open only if countries are at least poten-
tially closed . . . The distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon 
closure and without it cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life” 
(p. 39).
Might White flight account for the geography-specific empirical patterns 
noted by researchers? This is intimated by the results of the Multi-City Study 
of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), which uses neighborhood racial composition 
showcards to tap underlying residential proclivities. It finds White respon-
dents who prefer more homogeneous neighborhoods in the four cities sam-
pled—Detroit, Los Angeles, Boston, and Atlanta—to be significantly more 
likely to hold negative opinions of minority groups (Krysan, 2002). A replica-
tion of this study in the Netherlands renders a similar verdict, adding that 
Whites who are more hostile to minorities are significantly more likely to say 
they would leave an area with a large proportion of minorities (van Londen, 
2012). At the subjective level, therefore, the link between White attitudes to 
minorities and White flight appears robust and generalizable across several 
Western nations. Which endorses threat theorists’ claims that self-selection, 
that is, White flight, accounts for divergent findings between small and large-
scale contexts.
British Research
No existing studies of British attitudes to immigration simultaneously utilize 
small and large-unit ethnic contextual variables. However, there is mounting 
evidence for a disjuncture between local and metro-level contexts in research 
on voting for British anti-immigration parties. The importance of local ethnic 
contexts as predictors of support for the anti-immigrant British National 
Party (BNP) has been demonstrated in several studies (Bowyer, 2008; Ford 
& Goodwin, 2010; Harris, 2012; John, Margetts, Rowland, & Weir, 2006). 
Multi-level analyses of the BNP demonstrate that support is positively cor-
related with diversity at the Local Authority (LA) level, a unit typically con-
sisting of between 100,000 and 200,000 people.
By contrast, at ward level, with populations approximately a tenth as large 
as in LAs, diversity appears to exert a neutral or negative effect on BNP sup-
port. In neighborhoods above a threshold of 25% minority population, 
researchers find reduced White support for the BNP, whereas homogeneous 
wards and neighborhoods with few immigrants are more likely to vote for this 
anti-immigrant party (Biggs & Knauss, 2012; Bowyer, 2008).4 Others point to 
the combination of homogeneity-within-diversity: Heavily White British 
wards nested in diverse and changing LAs appear to offer fertile ground for 
the far right (Harris, 2012). Although only a small minority of White British 
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people who desire less immigration support the BNP, the salience of the immi-
gration issue for BNP supporters suggests the contextual drivers of BNP sup-
port may hold for the wider swathe of public opinion as well.
It is not our intention to replicate such analyses, but it is worth noting that 
the same pattern holds for immigration opinion in England and Wales. For 
example, if we examine the combined 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 waves of 
the Citizenship Surveys (Office for National Statistics and Home Office, 
2010, 2011), which asks around 16,000 White U.K.-born respondents in 
England and Wales about whether the level of immigration should be reduced 
or increased, we find precisely this relationship. Table 2 features a multi-level 
model of immigration opinion. This shows that, with controls for major indi-
vidual and contextual-level variables, the share of ethnic minorities at ward 
level (population averaging 7,700) is associated with less White U.K.-born 
opposition to immigration while the share of minorities at LA (population 
100,000-200,000) predicts heightened opposition.5
Table 2. Multi-Level Logistic Regression on Desire to Reduce Immigration (White 
U.K.-Born Only).
Income −.041*** (.009)
No qualifications .376*** (.077)
Middle class (ref: upper class) .413*** (.067)
Lower supervisory class (ref: upper class) .701*** (.096)
Working class (ref: upper class) .450*** (.07)
Private renter (ref: home owner) −.147 (.076)
Age .003 (.002)
London (ref: all other regions) −.197 (.148)
Resident over 10 years (ref: less than 10 years) .119* (.052)
Couple (ref: single) .154** (.05)
Ward: minority share of population −.017*** (.003)
Ward: Carstairs Index of Multiple Deprivation .049*** (.011)
Ward: population density −.007*** (.001)
LA: minority share of population .011** (.004)
Random effects
 Variance intercept ward .148*** (.037)
 Variance intercept LA .049** (.021)
N 13,616
Table entries are logged odds with robust standard errors, clustered by ward (N = 1,709) and 
LA (N = 364). Pseudo R2 not available in MLwiN. Bold results refer to the effect of diverse 
contexts at different levels. LA = Local Authority.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Does this pattern confirm contact theorists’ claim that only lower geo-
graphic scales offer opportunities for inter-ethnic contact to reduce White 
threat perceptions, or does it furnish evidence that White flight has left a 
disproportionately tolerant, skewed sample of Whites in diverse wards?
Self-Selection and White Flight Threat Theory
Migration theory tells us that most moves take place over small distances 
(Crowder & South, 2008) for reasons of cost and information; thus, those 
who exit diverse neighborhoods typically take up residence within the wider 
metropolitan area, county, or, in Britain, LA. This, therefore, would account 
for a pattern of higher-level opposition and ward-level tolerance. Previous 
researchers have done the best they can with available data to guard against 
endogeneity. Where researchers have addressed self-selection, they have 
typically regressed place of residence on individual values such as conserva-
tism or racial animus (e.g., Branton & Jones, 2005; Gay, 2006; Ha, 2010). 
Such work typically claims that Whites in diverse areas differ from Whites in 
homogeneous areas on the racial attitudes represented by the dependent vari-
able but not on racial attitudes that are used as instruments for it.
The self-selection tests are, as some authors admit, less than ideal. Such 
tests use a restricted number of parameters and depend upon imperfect instru-
ments for the dependent variable. Finally, the reliance on population stock 
data precludes any consideration of the magnitude and character of White 
population flows between geographic units that shape the composition of 
stocks—especially in diverse contexts where population turnover is often 
high. The ideal test for selective White flight would involve longitudinal data 
on attitudes. Krysan (2002) asks,
What are the mechanisms through which racial context operates on thoughts of 
mobility? Although the optimal approach for answering questions about 
motivations would be to use longitudinal data that measure both attitudes and 
behavior at the individual level, these data do not exist.
In a political science context, Abrajano and Hajnal (2009) remark that
most studies of contextual effects have been plagued by concerns about 
selection . . . Existing studies often try to control for various aspects of this 
selection but in the end few have been able to solve this fundamental problem.
Some scholars uncover significant self-selection effects. Oliver and Wong 
(2003), for example, account for endogeneity in a model of out-group stereotypes 
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by controlling for preferences in neighborhood ethnic composition. The param-
eter for White neighborhood preferences significantly predicted White attitudes, 
a similar association to that found in the MCSUI (Krysan, 2002). Although this 
did not eliminate the positive effect of local diversity on White attitudes toward 
outgroups, self-selection effects were considerably larger than contact effects.
Our longitudinal data take us a step further. They permit us to address, for 
what we believe to be the first time, the methodological difficulties of cross-
sectional studies of attitudes toward outgroups, so as to better gauge the 
extent of self-selection over a 20-year period. Whites who remain in diverse 
neighborhoods are predicted to be more tolerant of minorities and immigra-
tion than those who depart. Thus, if White flight theory is accurate:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): White flight: White British residents who are more 
hostile to immigration will be more likely to leave diverse wards than 
White British people who are less opposed to immigration.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): White avoidance: White British residents who are 
more hostile to immigration will tend to select less diverse wards to move 
to than White British people who are less opposed to immigration
Threat theory depends not only on a White flight effect but also on the 
volume of self-selection. Only significant replacement of anti-immigration 
Whites with pro-immigration Whites can account for the common finding 
that Whites in diverse neighborhoods, tracts, or wards are more tolerant of 
immigration than those in more homogeneous areas. Yet we know from a 1% 
sample of the census (ONS LS, 2001) that 6% to 7% of White British people 
leave diverse wards of England and Wales each year, that is, between 900 and 
1,050 individuals in a large urban ward containing 15,000 Whites. Given this 
figure, it would take 14 to 16 years for the attitudinal composition of the 
White population stock of a diverse ward to match the White inflow.6 The 
volume of White population turnover in diverse neighborhoods in England 
and Wales is thus large enough for selective White migration to account for 
the relatively pro-immigration attitudes of White British people in wards with 
a large minority presence. However, should we find that Whites departing an 
area of minority concentration manifest similar or more liberal views on 
immigration compared with Whites who remain or enter, the White flight 
threat hypothesis fails and contact theory may offer the best explanation.
Data
We use the longitudinal British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to test for 
self-selection through White flight. The BHPS is an annual longitudinal study 
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of some 5,500 households containing 10,300 individuals in England and 
Wales, which began in 1991. Attrition of cases reached 11% in the transition 
from Waves 1 to 2, but since then, recontact rates have remained high, gener-
ally well above 95%. In 2009, the survey merged into the Understanding 
Society longitudinal survey (the U.K. Household Longitudinal Study 
[UKHLS], 2012), but the UKHLS contains an annual sample of approxi-
mately 40,000, much larger than the 10,000 in the BHPS. We use linearly 
interpolated 1991, 2001, and 2011 ward-level census data from the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS; 2013), which is attached to individual survey 
records in the Citizenship Survey and BHPS-UKHLS. We use a common 
2001 ward geography to link census data across the three waves.7
Although similar to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the 
United States, the BHPS contains modules covering a wider array of subjec-
tive measures, notably, modules on party support, political participation, and 
national identity. This permits a fuller examination of the cultural and politi-
cal subjectivity of Whites who leave, enter, and remain in diverse areas, 
enabling us to generate a 20-year profile of White incomers to, out-migrants 
from, and stayers in, diverse wards. Our BHPS-UKHLS sample consists of 
172,200 White U.K.-born person-years of data for 1991-2012 across 19 sur-
vey waves. Wave size varies between 6,684 and 10,218 for the 18 waves of 
the BHPS, with 25,277 for the 19th wave (the 1st wave of the UKHLS), 
which contains a subsample of 7,000 individuals linked to the BHPS.8
Method
To test for self-selection, we first test for H1, the “flight” of conservative 
Whites. Namely, do conservative Whites tend to disproportionately outmi-
grate from diverse areas? Second, we examine H2, White “avoidance” of 
diverse destinations, by examining whether conservative Whites tend to 
move to Whiter areas than do liberal Whites. This is measured by the differ-
ence in the share of ethnic minorities between respondents’ origin and desti-
nation wards when they move. The combined BHPS-UKHLS for 1991-2012 
yields a total of 172,200 person-years of data on White U.K.-born British 
people, as shown in Table 3.
Of these, 156,779 (91% of the sample) did not move in the previous year. 
Even among movers, a further 2,953 individuals moved within ward in the 
previous year. This means only 7.2% of the sample moved between wards in 
the previous year. Note that this figure is in person-years; therefore, the share 
of individuals in the survey who moved at least once would be considerably 
higher, especially among individuals who survived the 19 waves of the sur-
vey (thereby leaving a 19-person-year footprint each in the data).
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Our BHPS-UKHLS figure compares well with census figures. The 2001 
census finds that 40,614 individuals in a 1% sample of the census (526,458 
persons) moved into their ward during the year 2000 to 2001 from another 
ward (ONS LS, 2001). This represents 7.7% of the sample, analogous to our 
7.2% annual movers. Notice that this data set—arguably the second longest 
running longitudinal survey in the world—underpins our contribution to 
knowledge: Without a longitudinal structure to the data, we could not deter-
mine moves to and from diversity. In the absence of a large enough sample, 
we could not amass sufficient cases for meaningful analysis of White movers 
in diverse wards.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the first set of models is the change in the percentage 
of ethnic minorities experienced by an individual when they move, that is, the 
difference in minority share between their ward of origin and ward of destina-
tion. This theoretically spans the range from −100 to +100, and ranges from +82 
to −75 in our data. As the sample is restricted to movers, this taps ethnic changes 
brought about by destination choice rather than in situ ethnic change. The depen-
dent variable in the second set of models is a dummy variable coded 1 for an 
inter-ward move in a given year and 0 for a non-move or intra-ward move.
Independent Variables
The BHPS-UKHLS permits us to observe the demographic, socioeconomic, 
and attitudinal characteristics of movers. In an ideal world, the data set would 
ask a question on attitudes to immigration. The longitudinal surveys do not, 
Table 3. Aggregate White Population Flows From BHPS-Understanding Society, 
1991-2012 (Person-Years).
Change in diversity (relative)  
White mover status Same Less More Total Share (%)
White stayer 153,567 1,534 1,678 156,779 91.0
White inter-ward mover 8,542 2,095 1,831 12,468 7.2
White intra-ward mover 2,879 33 41 2,953 1.7
Total 164,988 3,662 3,550 172,200 10.0
Source. BHPS (1991-2009); U.K. Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS; 2012).
BHPS = British Household Panel Survey. Change in diversity is relative, adjusted for average 
annual ethnic shift in dataset, based on change in diversity quintile.
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but record a series of items that are well-known proxies for immigration atti-
tudes—some in each wave, some only occasionally. These include modules 
on voting behavior and national identity, which have been found to directly 
predict immigration attitudes in the literature (Fetzer, 2000; Wright, Citrin, & 
Wand, 2012). We focus on Conservative party voting versus left-wing alter-
natives, and English national identity versus British or other, as proxy indica-
tors for greater opposition to immigration. These choices are justified on the 
basis of cross-tabulations in Table 4. Moreover, English identity is a signifi-
cant predictor of opposition to immigration in a version of the model pre-
sented in Table 2, even in the presence of numerous controls.9 Other attitudinal 
items in the BHPS were asked only in occasional years, and, given our inter-
est is in movers to and from diverse wards, a small subsample, these variables 
cannot be used for panel analysis. However, we test these in cross-sectional 
models of mobility.10
Questions on party vote and support were asked across all waves, permit-
ting us to conduct longitudinal data analysis using a dichotomous variable 
taking the value of 1 for Conservative party support and 0 for those backing 
the left-wing Liberals or Labour. In all, 36.6% of person-years in the sample 
supported the Conservatives, while 63.4% backed Labour or the Liberal 
Democrats. Another important proxy question for immigration attitudes, 
which is asked in all waves, is, “Please say which, if any, of the words on this 
card describes the way you think of yourself? Please choose as many or as 
few as apply.” Choices included English, British, European, Irish, Northern 
Irish, Scottish, Welsh, Other, None. Those who selected “English” only were 
assigned a 1, all others a 0. Across all waves, 8.87% of U.K.-born Whites 
opted to describe themselves as English only, which represents 39.2% of 
those who answered the national identity question.11 English national identity 
is associated, in many surveys, with significantly greater opposition to immi-
gration and, in Understanding Society, with elevated support for anti-immi-
gration parties, even in the presence of a wide range of individual and 
contextual controls.12
This said, as Table 4 reveals, the immigration attitude difference—across 
a range of distinct questions—between White Conservative and Left (Labour, 
Liberal Democrat, Green) party voters in the British Election Study (BES) 
was just 13 points in 1997 when Tony Blair took office. It stood at 12 points 
in the 2010 British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA), although this widens to 
over 30 points for recalled 2005 vote in the 2015 BES. Among English identi-
fiers, opposition to immigration was only 2 points higher than the White 
average in the 1997 BES and 3 points higher in the 2010-2011 Citizenship 
Survey and 2010 BSA, although nearly 20 points more elevated among those 
identifying as “strongly English” in the 2015 BES.
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In view of the sometimes modest association between univariate proxies 
(Conservative voting, Englishness) and anti-immigration attitudes, we also 
include variables derived from the cross-tabulation of university education 
and voting, or class and voting. These offer stronger proxies for immigration 
opinion. Thus, university-educated left voters were more than twice as likely 
as the average respondent to support Black and Asian immigration in 1997, 
three times as likely to favor increased or current levels in the 2010 BSA, 
and nearly 30 points more likely than average to say immigration enriches 
rather than undermines Britain’s cultural life. Middle-class Left voters are 
nearly as pro-immigration as university-educated Left voters. Working-class 
Conservative voters are less than half as positive on immigration as the aver-
age White British respondent. Finally, the 2015 BES offers a sufficient sam-
ple (N = 563) of populist right BNP and UKIP voters to see that virtually none 
(7.6%) are positive about the cultural effects of immigration. The crosstabu-
lation in Table 4 forms the basis for our choice to use university-educated 
Left voter, working-class Conservative voter, and populist right voter as 
proxies for immigration attitudes in the analyses to follow.
Results
Results of models with univariate proxies are run first and displayed in 
Table 5. We use a single dummy variable for party vote taking the value of 1 
for Conservative and 0 for a Left party (Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green). 
Likewise for English identity. Model 1 presents a linear regression of the 
change in ethnic minority share experienced by an individual who moves 
wards. This measures H2: whether movers seek or avoid diversity. Independent 
variables include demographic, economic, and contextual variables with 
robust standard errors clustered on wards. Only inter-ward movers are consid-
ered. To focus on variables of interest, most demographic and economic 
parameters are not shown. Models 1 and 3 include all respondents (both U.K.-
born Whites and other ethnic groups), while Models 2 and 4 are restricted to 
U.K.-born Whites.
Model 1 shows that inter-ward movers, whether White or minority, who 
originate in more diverse wards move to less diverse wards than those who 
leave from more homogeneous wards. This reflects the fact that those moving 
from diverse wards have fewer higher diversity options open to them than 
those in homogeneous wards. Yet, from Model 1, we also see that there is a 
negative coefficient for the White U.K.-born dummy variable. This means 
U.K.-born Whites who move wards move to significantly less diverse 
places than minorities, even with controls for individual class, income, edu-
cation, age, housing tenure, and contextual characteristics—the deprivation, 
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population density, and proportion of renters in origin and destination wards. 
This finding is in keeping with the White avoidance hypothesis but could be 
generated by minority behavior or by differences in information or social 
networks between groups rather than by White attitudes. Thus, we need to 
test whether tolerant Whites are less likely to move away from diversity than 
anti-immigrant Whites before we can confirm a White avoidance pattern that 
might explain the hypothesized contextual effects (Whites more tolerant in 
diverse wards) we saw in Table 2.
Model 1 reveals that U.K.-born Whites move to significantly Whiter 
wards than non-Whites or foreign-born Whites. Model 3, by contrast, which 
tests for White flight (H1), shows that while the coefficient is signed in the 
direction of White exit, it is not significant: White British are no more likely 
to leave diverse wards than other ethnic groups. Indeed, all ethnic groups 
tend to leave wards with high concentrations of minority groups, which com-
ports with the existing U.K. urban studies literature (i.e., Catney & Simpson, 
2010). So we have evidence for “ethnic avoidance” but not “White flight” if 
we define these terms by reference to unexplained ethnic residuals. But what 
of the deeper meaning of flight and avoidance, linked to subjective attitudes 
toward immigrants?
Here, Model 1 shows no significant association between measures of anti-
immigration sentiment—Conservative voting and English identity—and 
moving to Whiter wards. Where Model 1 looked at differences both within 
and between individuals, Model 2 narrows the focus to examine differences 
over time within individuals. We possess 125,692 observations across 13,877 
unique individuals yielding an average of 9.1 observations per individual. 
Longitudinal data permit us to monitor changes in attitudes before and after 
people move to different racial contexts. Conditioning on variables that are 
correlated with both mobility and attitudes provides an estimate of the aver-
age causal effect of a change in (proxy) immigration attitudes on the degree 
to which an inter-ward mover selects a different racial environment. Model 2 
presents a fixed-effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression of ward 
ethnic composition on party support, for Whites only. If the White avoidance 
hypothesis is correct, we would expect lagged Conservative voting to predict 
that an individual will move to a Whiter area than a Left party supporter when 
they move. In other words, conservative Whites in diverse areas should move 
to less diverse neighborhoods than their liberal neighbors. The dummy vari-
able for Conservative (vs. Liberal/Labour/Green) voting is, however, not sta-
tistically significant, again disconfirming H2.13
Models 3 and 4 examine White flight (H1), asking whether those who 
originate in diverse wards (defined as 30% minority or more) stay or move to 
Whiter areas. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 for a 
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move to a non-diverse (<30% minority) ward and 0 for staying in, or moving 
to another, diverse ward. This model asks whether Whites, especially conser-
vative Whites, are more likely to leave diverse wards for Whiter wards as 
compared with liberal Whites. Model 3 is a logistic regression model that 
includes minorities and Model 4 a conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regres-
sion model restricted to Whites.14
The results reveal a similar pattern to Models 1 and 2: Although Model 3 
does not show that Whites are more likely to leave diverse wards than minori-
ties, the coefficient is signed in the right direction. Model 3 finds no signifi-
cant attitudinal effects. Model 4, which is restricted to Whites, shows likewise 
that conservative and liberal Whites are equally likely to leave diverse wards, 
disconfirming H1. The lack of association is striking: Across all models, 
coefficients for Conservative vote and English identity are in the hypothe-
sized direction in half and in the wrong direction in half. Results are robust to 
the inclusion of non-voters and those who voted for parties other than those 
included in the party variables used here.15
To recap, first, while White movers select significantly Whiter destina-
tions than ethnic minorities, anti-immigration and pro-immigration Whites 
(on our proxy measures) select wards of similar diversity to move to. Second, 
there is no selective flight of White conservatives out of diverse areas. It is 
worth adding that attitudinal variables measuring British patriotism, tradi-
tional gender roles, right-wing ideology, and negative attitudes to homosexu-
als, asked only in occasional years in the BHPS, were similarly uncorrelated 
with moving to Whiter wards.16 These results chime with those of Gallego, 
Buscha, Sturgis, and Oberski (2014) whose work with the BHPS finds that 
Conservative supporters in Britain tend not to self-select into Conservative-
dominated constituencies (which tend to be somewhat Whiter than Labour 
ones)—all of which cast doubt on the argument that Whites who dislike 
immigration leave diverse areas while those who are tolerant of immigration 
move toward, or remain in, diverse areas.
Yet it could be argued that the proxy measures we deployed are too blunt 
to capture immigration opinion, the dependent variable in Table 2. In our 
discussion of predictors of immigration opinion, we noted in Table 4 that 
multivariate proxies were much stronger measures of immigration attitudes 
than univariate terms for party support or English identity. Indeed, we saw 
that among U.K.-born Whites, university-educated voters for left-wing par-
ties are outstandingly pro-immigration while working-class Conservative 
voters are strongly anti-immigration. Moreover, it is only in interaction with 
diverse contexts that we would expect these measures to be activated. 
Interacting these multivariate proxy groups with minority share therefore 
affords us a sharper test of H1 and H2. For instance, H1 predicts that a 
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degree-holding Left party voter would be more likely to remain in a ward 
than others as the ward becomes more diverse. H2 holds that the same person, 
if they move, will choose a ward that is more diverse than that selected by 
another respondent.
Table 6 presents results of four models along the same lines as Table 5 but 
restricted to U.K.-born Whites and using multivariate proxies for immigra-
tion attitudes. These show, as expected, that the share of minorities in one’s 
prior ward of residence (a year ago) is an important determinant of whether, 
and where, one moves. As in Table 5, residents of diverse wards tend to leave 
more often than residents of Whiter wards. Residents of diverse wards also 
tend to select Whiter wards because there are few other diverse wards to 
move to, and because diverse wards in Britain tend to be deprived and 
crowded.
Moving to tests of our main hypotheses, our more granular immigration-
proxy measures tell a similar story to Table 5, in that pro- and anti-immigra-
tion Whites exhibit a similar propensity to leave diverse wards. However, we 
now find some weak effects from self-selection, in the hypothesized direc-
tion. The sign on Conservative voter is in the hypothesized (H2) direction in 
Model 1 and close to significance. The working-class Conservative interac-
tion, our finer proxy for anti-immigration attitudes, as well as its interaction 
with minority share, is also in the hypothesized direction but well short of 
significance. Moreover, in Model 2, White working-class Conservative vot-
ers are significantly more likely to remain in diverse wards than others, which 
runs counter to what is predicted by H1. Results are robust to the exclusion of 
non-voters and those who voted for parties other than those included in the 
party variables used here.
In terms of White avoidance, the story is more complex: White working-
class conservatives do not move to significantly Whiter wards than other 
White movers, but White left-voting degree holders—our proxy for pro-
immigration respondents—who originate in diverse wards do move to rela-
tively diverse wards compared with White movers originating in the same 
areas. Likewise, English identifiers who move from diverse wards select sig-
nificantly Whiter places to move to than other Whites who depart from analo-
gous wards. This lends support to H2, but is the effect large enough to account 
for the 10-point difference in immigration opinion17 among Whites living in 
the least and most diverse wards in England and Wales?
We know there is no difference in “flight” from diverse wards between 
pro- and anti-immigration Whites, so White avoidance must do all the work 
to produce the requisite 10-point immigration tolerance gap between Whites 
in diverse and homogeneous wards observed in Table 2. We would expect 
anti-immigration Whites to select wards that average a full 10 points Whiter 
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than those chosen by pro-immigration Whites. This would generate a distinc-
tive attitudinal inflow, producing a selectively liberal population stock which 
is 10 points more tolerant in diverse wards than in homogenous ones. In this 
case, self-selection would account for the disparate LA-ward contextual 
effects set out in Table 2.
Yet, as Figure 1 shows, the predicted change in the share of minorities in 
one’s ward as a result of a move differs only modestly between pro- and anti-
immigration Whites. Using left degree-holders as the pro-immigration atti-
tude proxy yields a difference of just 2 points from other White respondents, 
while using English identifiers (not shown) produces a difference of just 0.3 
points from other Whites. These differences, while significant, take us at 
most a fifth of the way toward H2, 8 points shy of what is required to account 
for the softening effects of diversity on immigration opinion recorded in 
Table 2.
Even this may overstate the effects since H1 is not borne out: White left 
degree-holders are not disproportionately represented among those choosing 
to stay in diverse areas. In response to concerns over the modifiable area unit 
problem (i.e., Wong et al., 2012), it is worth noting that a similar pattern holds 
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 %
 m
in
or
iti
es
 in
 w
ar
d 
(o
rig
in
-d
es
tin
at
io
n)
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46
% minorities  in individual's origin ward
Other Left voter with degree (prior to move)
Figure 1. Predicted change in % minorities due to move (Whites only).
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for moves at the higher geography of the Local Authority (LA): Whites move 
to Whiter LAs than minorities, but there is only a very modest difference in 
destination between liberal and conservative Whites—the coefficients for 
immigration proxies are even weaker than at ward level. This suggests height-
ened opposition to immigration in diverse LAs is also not the result of selec-
tion, thus leaving the door open to threat-based explanations.
The BHPS allows us to proxy immigration attitudes using party support—
English national identity, education, class, and multivariate combinations 
thereof—but one might still argue these measures do not fully capture immi-
gration attitudes. Therefore, we undertake two further robustness checks. 
First, there is little doubt that support for a populist right party (BNP or UKIP) 
is associated with opposition to immigration—in Table 4 we found that all 
but 7.6% of populist right supporters held negative attitudes toward immigra-
tion. Data on far right (mostly BNP) and UKIP voting comes from the first 
three waves of the Understanding Society (UKHLS) surveys of 2009-2013, 
with a sample of approximately 30,000 White British individuals per wave. 
The number of far right supporters is 490 in Wave 1, 337 in Wave 2, and 221 
in Wave 3, a declining pattern corresponding to the waning of BNP vote share 
over 2009-2012. UKIP supporters numbered 393 in Wave 1, 364 in Wave 2, 
and 431 in Wave 3, a broadly rising pattern consonant with the general trend 
of growing UKIP support during 2009-2012. Although UKIP also trades on 
an anti-elite and anti-European message, concerns over immigration are cen-
tral to its appeal (Ford & Goodwin, 2014). Combining UKIP and Far Right 
supporters furnishes 2,226 anti-immigration person-years of data out of a 
sample of some 90,000 White British person-years.
Table 7 presents results from two random-effects GLS models. We use the 
same analytical strategy used earlier with BHPS data on working-class 
Conservative voting, this time concentrating on UKHLS data on the BNP and 
UKIP. As in Table 6, the dependent variable in Model 1 is a dummy coded 1 
for a move out and 0 for remaining in, or moving within, ward.18 In Model 2, 
which is restricted to movers, the dependent variable is the difference in 
minority share between origin and destination ward.
The story corroborates findings from Tables 5 and 6. Model 1 considers 
White flight. Here, the key parameter is the interaction between anti-immi-
gration party voting and share of minorities in origin ward. Whites who sup-
port anti-immigration parties and live in diverse wards are not significantly 
more likely to leave their ward than Whites in identical wards who do not 
support such parties or Whites who support such parties but live in Whiter 
wards. This contradicts H1. Model 2 examines White avoidance. The main 
effect and interactions for anti-immigration party support are not significant. 
Thus, again we find that anti-immigration Whites (as indicated by populist 
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right support) move to areas that are no Whiter than those selected by more 
liberal Whites, contrary to that predicted by H2. This said, it bears mention-
ing that all coefficients are signed in the hypothesized direction, hinting at 
small White flight and avoidance effects among those who strongly oppose 
immigration.
As a final robustness check, we commissioned a YouGov political tracker 
survey of 1,869 British adults that contains both immigration-proxy items 
from the BHPS-UKHLS such as party vote and national identity as well as 
direct questions on race and immigration.19 Of the 1,638 White British 
respondents, 906 claimed not to have moved wards over the past decade, 384 
said they had moved wards, while the rest were unsure. Comparing White 
British stayers with those who reported they had moved to less or more 
diverse wards, Table 8 shows that the BHPS-UKHLS attitude proxies have a 
similar relationship to mobility as anti-immigration attitudes. Namely, 
although there are small attitudinal differences between Whites who said they 
Table 7. Random Effects Models Predicting Mobility (White British Respondents 
Only), 2009-2012.
Model 1 Model 2
 
GLS logistic 
regression 
predicting move out 
of ward
GLS linear regression 
predicting increase in 
minority share in ward 
due to move
Mover (lag) 0.933 (0.192)***  
Minority population share in 
ward (lag)
0.003 (0.003) −0.419 (0.01)***
UKIP/BNP supporter (lag) −0.191 (0.277) −0.226 (1.721)
UKIP/BNP supporter × Minority 
population share (lag)
0.014 (0.019) −0.146 (0.138)
R2 — .529
N 20,806 2,557
Groups 20,806 2,361
Source. U.K. Household Longitudinal Study (2012).
The following controls were added to Model 1 but not shown in the regression table: 
Carstairs index of deprivation in ward (lagged), age, highest qualification (lagged), marital 
status (lagged), and housing tenure (lagged). The following controls were added to Model 
1 but not shown in the regression table: Carstairs index of deprivation in ward (lagged), 
change in ward Carstairs index of deprivation, change in ward population density, age, highest 
qualification (lagged), marital status (lagged), and housing tenure (lagged). BNP = British 
National Party.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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moved toward diversity and away, negative immigration attitudes are not 
associated with moving away from diversity. This is especially so when 
demographic and socioeconomic variables are included in a model predicting 
a move to/from diversity.20
Stayers, meanwhile, are more conservative on immigration than those 
leaving diversity. These findings echo work on the BNP, which finds support 
for the party to be strongest in wards with limited White inflows and out-
flows, that is, with a high proportion of stayers (Harris, 2012). At the 2008 
Greater London Authority elections, when support for the BNP was at its 
peak, wards that received a large amount of “White flight” were actually less 
supportive of the BNP. All of which questions H1 and H2. Previous work 
finds that people’s subjective assessment of their local diversity matters more 
for voting, participation, and attitudes than objective measures of diversity 
based on census boundaries. They misperceive levels of diversity at higher 
geographies more than at lower levels (Leighley, 2001; Wong et al., 2012). 
Crucially, this YouGov survey tests people’s pseudoenvironment—their sub-
jective perceptions of past and present neighborhood diversity—and uncov-
ers a similar pattern to that observed with the objective census measures used 
in Tables 5 and 6. Likewise, in Table 2, when we substitute a subjective mea-
sure of area diversity for census ward minority share, we find that Whites 
who describe their area as more diverse are more tolerant of immigration.21 
This gives us added confidence that selection effects, whether based on 
Table 8. Characteristics (in %) of White British Survey Sample, by Self-Reported 
Mobility Status, 2013.
Movers from 
diversity
Movers to 
diversity Stayer
Immigration: Increase or same 23% 25% 17%
Immigration: reduce a little 16% 21% 19%
Immigration: reduce a lot 60% 54% 64%
N 146 89 906
English identity 43% 40% 50%
Conservative party 28% 25% 28%
N 148 91 927
Discomfort interracial 
marriage
21% 14% 23%
N 139 83 903
Source. YouGov (2013).
N = 1,638 White British adults. Note that number of cases is slightly different for different 
groups of variables depending on response rate.
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objective or subjective measures of context and locale, are not driving the 
findings in contextual studies of voting and public opinion.
Discussion
Most contextual studies of voting and public opinion find that diversity in 
large geographic contexts such as county or metropolitan area predicts a 
threat response among Whites, while diversity at low levels of geography 
such as ward or tract is associated with more liberal attitudes and voting. Is 
this pattern best explained by the fact there are more opportunities for contact 
at lower rather than higher geographies? Or is it a by-product of “White 
flight”: the self-selection of intolerant Whites out, and tolerant Whites in, to 
diverse locales.
Research on the effects of local diversity on voting and public opinion has 
been hampered by the lack of longitudinal data with which to test for self-
selection through White flight from diversity, or partisan flight. The validity 
of work on the role of racial context in activating threat perceptions or facili-
tating positive contacts with minorities hinges on whether self-selection can 
be satisfactorily addressed. This analysis, which uses large-scale longitudinal 
data geocoded to low geographic levels, addresses this concern. It helps vali-
date previous contextual work by demonstrating that self-selection is not a 
convincing explanation for positive White attitudes to immigration and 
diversity in diverse local contexts. Nor can it explain the relatively negative 
attitudes to immigration in diverse larger geographies such as Local 
Authorities.
We believe these findings may be generalized to other countries. Dutch 
replication of the MCSUI study suggests the relationship between White resi-
dential preferences and attitudes to minorities in the Netherlands and America 
are quite similar (van Londen, 2012). Moreover, European and American 
research shows that ethnic context has broadly similar effects on White immi-
gration attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic (Semyonov & Glikman, 2009).
This article also reinforces the small but growing number of studies that find 
that self-selection does not account for partisan residential patterns or contex-
tual effects. Gallego et al. (2014), analyzing the same longitundinal BHPS data 
used here, and Cho, Gimpel, and Hui (2013), using American voter registration 
data, likewise find no evidence that partisans tend to “sort” into strongly parti-
san areas, as intimated by work such as that of Bishop and Cushing (2008). In 
both the British and American case, socialization and compositional effects 
(i.e., Whites and families moving to Republican counties) seem to account for 
partisan segregation. Our findings likewise uncover only a weak effect from 
self-selection. Self-selection is arguably the major criticism of findings in the 
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wider literature on the contextual effects of voting and public opinion. This 
work should go some way toward allaying those concerns.
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Notes
 1. This said, negative contact in intimate contexts has the capacity to lead to rising 
threat perceptions (Barlow et al., 2012).
 2. References for Table 1 are in Supplemental Table 1 at www.sneps.net/cps1sup-
plemental.htm
 3. Some of the exceptions entail situations where hostility is directed toward spe-
cific groups (i.e., Hispanics in America, Muslims in Europe, low-income minori-
ties) but not others (i.e., East Asians, Afro-Caribbeans in Europe, high-income 
minorities). See, for example, Ha (2010) for East Asians, or Biggs and Knauss 
(2012) for Afro-Caribbeans.
 4. Biggs and Knauss (2012) use Output Areas, with populations under 1,000, as 
their measure of locale, whereas Bowyer (2008) and Harris (2012) use wards. In 
all studies, local diversity is associated with lower, and LA diversity with higher, 
BNP support.
 5. Full model specification and variable distributions available upon request.
 6. For calculations, see Supplemental Table 2 at www.sneps.net/cps1supplemental.
htm
 7. Potential problems associated with changes in ward boundaries between the 
1991 and 2001 censuses are mitigated by our use of GeoConvert software (http://
geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk/, accessed July 2, 2013). To arrive at common 2001-
2011 wards, we build wards up from a common geography based on Middle 
Layer Super Output Areas.
 8. Those born abroad, and subjects living in Scotland or Northern Ireland, are excluded, 
to most closely approximate the ethnic majority group in England and Wales.
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 9. See Supplemental Table 3, Model 4 at www.sneps.net/cps1supplemental.htm
10. See Supplemental Table 4, Model 4 at www.sneps.net/cps1supplemental.htm
11. This was just below the response for British, at 41.75%.
12. See Supplemental Table 3, Model 3 at www.sneps.net/cps1supplemental.htm
13. The annual sample size for the English identity question is small and variable, so 
it is omitted from fixed-effects models; however, this term is also not statistically 
significant.
14. Note that sample size drops in Model 4 because it is a conditional (fixed-effects) 
logit model.
15. This is done by running Conservative and Left party as separate variables, com-
pared with the entire sample, which includes non-voters.
16. See Supplemental Table 4 at www.sneps.net/cps1supplemental.htm
17. The gross difference is actually 20 points, but 10 points are accounted for by 
age, education, marital status, and other compositional characteristics that differ 
between diverse and homogeneous wards.
18. A move to a ward of similar ethnic diversity is coded 0.
19. For details on YouGov survey methodology and questionnaire, see http://
d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/kf5d231qce/
YG-Archive-ESRC-Demos-Birkbeck-results-300713.pdf
20. Models (available upon request) using YouGov data with move toward/away 
from diversity as the dependent variable find immigration and immigration-
proxy attitudes not to be significant predictors of White mobility.
21. The Citizenship Survey question reads, “People in my local area have the same 
ethnic group as me,” with responses on a four-item scale from “all the same” to 
“less than half.” Coefficients are similar to the objective ward diversity measure, 
although standard errors are somewhat larger—which could be due to differ-
ences of unit.
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